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In the Sttpreme Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
AMERICAN FORK IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a corporation; PLEASANT GROVE IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a corporation; and LEHI 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
HAROLD A. LINKE, as State Engineer of the 
State of Utah (Successor in Office of Ed H. 
Watson, former State Engineer of the State of CASE 
Utah); KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA- NO. 6726 
TION, a corporation; UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY, 
a municipal corporation; UTAH AND SALT 
LAKE CANAL COMPANY, a corporation; 
NORTH JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a corporation; SOUTH JORDAN CANAL 
COMPANY, a corporation; and EAST JOR-
DAN IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State Engineer rejected the application of there-
spondent irrigation companies for a change in the nature 
of the use of a portion of their water rights to permit their 
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more beneficial use by early' storage and later release for ir-
rigation. The acquisition of additional water or the enlarge-
ment of existing rights was not sought, the requested change 
being limited to a small part of the water rights concededly 
owned by respondents. 
At a trial de novo in the District Court on appeal from 
the State Engineer's determination, the appellant corpora-
tions relied upon the State Engineer's decision that the 
change could not be administered by him. The State En-
gineer was represented by the Attorney General's office at 
the hearing in the District Court and the Deputy State En-
gineer, who formulated the opinion in the State Engineer's 
office, was present and testified briefly on other matters 
but made no showing, directly or indirectly, as to the im-
practicability of administering the change. On the other 
hand, evidence was introduced to the effect that the pro-
posed plan was feasible and readily could be administered. 
After a full hearing before the District Court, the court 
found that the change should be permitted and could be 
readily administered without detriment to the appellants. 
The judgment of the District Court provided: 
"That the decision of the State Engineer dated the 2nd 
of March, 1949, rejecting plaintiffs' Change Application 
a-1945 be, and the same is, hereby reversed and set 
aside and said application is hereby remanded to the 
State Engineer with directions to re-instate said appli-
cation a-1945 in the records of the office of the State 
Engineer of the State of Utah and to allow and approve 
the same with the priority date of the original filing 
of the said application, to-wit: the 16th day of January, 
1946; provided that such allowance be subject to the 
existing rights of the parties hereto and without preju-
dice to the rights of any and all parties hereto to chal-
I 
r 
I. 
I '~ 
·~ 
I ~I 
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lenge the nature and extent of, or limitations upon, or 
use of, any of the water rights of said parties in, and to, 
the waters. of the American Fork River." 
The application, by its tenns, was limited in its opera-
tion to water owned by the respondents. The evidence of 
respondents was to this effect. A showing was made be-
fore, and adopted by, the District Court that appellants' 
rights were intended not to be, and would not be, interfered 
with in any respect. The judgment of the court was to the 
same effect, saving all rights of the appellants in conformity 
with the statute and the cases governing the effect of such 
approved conditions. Despite these things, appellants seek 
to have such approval reversed by this Court. 
In appellants' "Statement of Facts" arel set out the 
general issues which they say divide the parties. It is stated 
that "the main point is as to whether the owner of an upper 
right to use water for direct application may store it for 
later season use, when the lower users' rights depend upon 
the run-off flow and seepage water from such direct appli-
cation." This proposition assumes as a fact what the court 
found was not a fact, and disregards the evidence that 
whether run-off entered the lake in the summer or fall, it 
was alike available for the use of the appellants-carry-over 
water being the most important phase of the lake supply. 
Other propositions contained in appellants' purported 
Statement of Facts are likewise slanted. 
A statement of the issues dividing the parties from re-
spondents' point of view is whether the appellants are in a 
position to prevent a change in the nature of use in the ab-
sence of any showing or authorized findings that they would 
be detrimentally affected; whether the users from a lower 
storage right can forever "freeze" upper rights and prevent 
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their more beneficial utilization under the claim that in some 
indefinable way the storage might be affected or the time 
the return flow enters the lake might be changed, although 
no detriment would result; whether there must be some 
substantial injury or detriment to authorize users to ob-
ject to a change in the nature of use by others, or whether 
mere fanciful, speculative or infinitesimal effects suffice; 
whether users from Utah Lake are in a position to prevent 
any alteration whatsoever in the manner of the application 
of water in the surrounding areas merely because theor-
retically any ·alteration might appreciably affect the seep-
age into the lake; whether the greatest beneficial use of 
water in this arid region is to be prevented in the absence 
of a showing of prejudice on the part of those objecting; 
whether the lower storage right may, either because of the I : 
actual, or supposed inadequacy of the storage area, waste 
into Great Salt Lake quantities of water each year many 
times greater than are sought to be held back temporarily 
by respondents in connection with the proposed change, and 
yet say in effect, you might affect the time when our water 
enters the lake and therefore, you may not make the high-
est beneficial use of your water, notwithstanding that dur-
ing your holdback period, we must release many times the 
amount involved in your application because we get too 
much water in the lake; whether an application for change 
in the nature of use is the appropriate application on which 
I.\ 
to base the proposed temporary storage, or whether asap- . '· 
plicants claim a change application or an application to ap-
propriate should have been filed even though respondents 
seek neither to exchange water with anyone else nor ap-
propriate any additional water; whether the fact that the 
State Engineer rejected respondents' application on the 
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ground that it was impractical from the standpoint of ad-
ministration, deprives the court on appeal in a trial de novo, 
particularly when the State Engineer declines to support in 
any way his determination in the evidence before the Dis-
trict Court, from considering the practicality of such change 
or from making a finding contrary to the State Engineer's 
determination; whether under our system of law when a 
review by trial de novo is provided by the Legislature, the 
State Engineer's decision must be deemed final and binding 
no matter what the court on the evidence may find or de-
termine. 
We shall discuss these matters in connection with our 
argument under the three main headings of appellants' ar-
gument. 
To further indicate the essential elements of this case 
as a preliminary matter, however, we need to mention that 
the three respondent corporations, acting for the citizens 
of practically all of northern Utah County, own and distrib-
ute for irrigation, culinary and domestic purposes, substan-
tially all of the waters of American Fork River between 
April fifteenth and October first of each year. Their direct 
flow rights are not questioned. There existing a natural 
storage basin near Silver Lake Basin, toward the head-
waters of the river, they now propose to hold back 1000 
acre feet of the waters of the river that they would other-
wise use in April or May, and release it in June, July or Au-
gust when water for irrigation is scarce, in order that their 
stream may be sustained in quantity to the extent feasible 
for such later irrigation. They propose to accomplish this 
holdback only out of waters which they have always used. 
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STATEMENT OF FACfS 
We find it necessary to disaffirm a number of the 
claimed facts set out by appellants and to add a number of 
salient facts not mentioned by them. Some of the state-
ments that are merely colored in their Statement of Facts 
we have left to be appraised by the Court without com-
ment in view of the whole record. 
In connection with the statement on page 3 of appel-
lants' brief that all of the waters available from Utah Lake 
have been fully appropriated and that the waters therefrom 
have been, for many years, insufficient to supply the rights 
thereto, it should be noted that long after respondents' 
rights were initiated, the Kennecott Copper Corporation 
applied for, and was granted, new rights (Tr. 344-345); that 
thousands of acre feet of water have been wasted into Great 
Salt Lake from Utah Lake because of the fact that they 
could not be used under existing rights and necessities (Tr. 
146-153) and that there are numerous rights secondary to 
the appellants that never protested in this case and whose 
rights would be affected if any were, prior to any effect 
upon appellants' rights. 
The elevation of the proposed reservoir site is not 9,000 
to 9,500 feet, but between 7,000 and 8,000 feet (Tr. 130, 
280). The reservoir site is about 1,000 feet lower than Sil-
ver Lake Basin (Tr. 377). 
We deny that the record shows that the total maximum 
flow which can be diverted and used by respondents at 
any time is 300 c.f.s. as asserted on page 5 of appellants' 
brief and call attention to Watermaster Searle's testimony 
that about 500 second feet can be diverted and measured 
over the weir (Tr. 35, 56) and that while he did testify that 
between 300 and 350 second feet were turned into their 
. r 
I 
l
'i !, 
/ 
,A 
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canals, he testified that at least part of the excess that 
went down the creek during unusually high water was 
used through lower diversions (Tr. 44) and that in ordi-
nary years, up to 350 second feet has been diverted (Tr. 
350). Any water above the capacity of respondents' canals 
has been for a relatively brief period of time (Tr. 63). In 
his long experience, on only one day did Watermaster 
Searle see any water wasting down th~ natural channel 
(Tr. 58). 
The appellants recite that whether the capacity of the 
respondents' diversion ditches may be required for bene-
ficial use at any time depends upon changing conditions 
from season to season and from day to day. The record 
does not bear this out, since all the evidence shows that to 
the extent the water is available, the respondents have bene-
ficially used the flow of American Fork River up to the total 
capacity of their ditches (Tr. 58, 73, 85). 
In connection with the table of maximum flows of 
American Fork River appearing on page 8 of appellants' 
brief, it is significant that the great majority of measure-
ments are substantially less than 300 c.f.s. It must also be 
remembered that these maximum flows are measurements 
showing the highest point reached in the entire month of 
each year. For the other 29 or 30 days of the month and for 
a.ll times during the day, except at the particular time of 
the measurement in question, the flow was less. Yet this 
maximum flow in May of 1934, according to the record cited 
by appellants, was only 65 second feet; in the same month of 
1939, 190 second feet; in 1943, 184 second feet; in June of 
1931, 76 second feet; June, 1934, 28 second feet; June, 1939, 
181 second feet; June, 1940, 120; and June, 1946, 200 second 
feet. Even at the highest point reached at any single time 
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in these years, there would be wholly inadequate water to 
fill respondents' ditches. 
On page 9 of appellants' brief, it is argued that "Since 
it is alleged (R. 9) that the purpose is to withhold the 35 
c.f.s. from the 'high-water' flows, and it is also admitted or 
established that as these high-water flows at the diversion 
point substantially exceed 300 c.f .s. and approach or exceed 
400 c.f.s., the entire 35 c.f.s., if not withheld, would reach 
the lake immediately." This is the false premise on which 
much, if nat all, of appellants' case is based. Contrary to 
the "Statement of Facts" of appellants, there is nothing on 
page 9 of the record, or nothing in the evidence, or findings, 
or ju~gment of the court, whioh warrants the argument that 
the intent or effect of plaintiffs' application is to hold back 
or utilize a portion of the flow beyond the capacity of re-
spondents' ditches which, unless held back, would flow into 
the lake. It is made clear on page 9 of the record, being 
respondents' complaint on appeal, that the hold-back would 
be of water that would otherwise be consumptively utilized 
by respondents, and that any unusually high water that 
would be beyond the capacity of respondents' ditches or 
would not otherwise be beneficially used, would be permit-
ted to flow directly down the channel as it always had. Re-
spondents endeavor to convert a simple process of water 
regulation and control into an impossible task, but as En-
gineer Richards pointed out, this administration would be 
similar to that utilized on countless other streams. 
Pages 8 and 9 of the record show that respondents' 
complaint, insofar as pertinent to appellants' assertions re-
ferred to, stated: 
"18. That with the exception of unusually high water, 
the said waters of American Fork Creek have been put \ ~ 
I 
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to a beneficial use by the said plaintiffs and their stock-
holders and their grantors and predecessors in interest 
during each and every portion of the year and that the 
said waters, when beneficially and carefully used, have 
not been more than sufficient to supply their necessi-
ties for irrigation, stock-watering and domestic pur-
poses; that by reason of the great fluctuation of the 
waters of said creek, only a portion of the lands of the 
stockholders of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in 
interest could be irrigated during the summer and lat-
ter part of the irrigation season when the water had 
receded to what is commonly known as low-water, and 
that, as a result, the high water flow of the river has, 
of necessity, been used by the plaintiffs on crops that 
could be produced by a limited number of irrigations 
"19. That in order to enable the stockholders of the 
plaintiffs to produce more valuable crops, it has become 
necessary for the plaintiffs to have a portion of the 
high-water heretofore used in the irrigating of less 
valuable crops, stored for later and more beneficial use 
and that it is fior the purpose of permitting 
this more beneficial use by the storage of high water 
between April15 and June 15 of each year, which high 
water has been heretofore appropriated and used for 
early irrigation, that the said storage as specified in 
said application is necessary. 
"20. That these applicants are the owners and have 
the right to distribute, operate and control all of the wa-
ters for which storage is sought under said application 
and that they have diverted and used said water under 
claim of right and against the whole world and particu-
larly against the defendants for more than 60 years 
, 
It thus will be seen that respondents did not seek to 
hold back, and they never since have sought to hold back, 
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any water that went directly into the lake but only such wa-
ter as they have otherwise and would otherwise use for ir-
rigation. Appellants' statement that the 35 second feet 
hold-back would be water that otherwise would go directly 
into the lake is a mere straw man. It is true in exception-
ally high water there has been on rare occasions part of the 
American Fork River that has not been used for irrigation 
but has gone down the natural channel into the lake. We 
have never claimed the right to use this water, but the 
period when such condition exists is brief and most infre-
quent and involves not high water in the common accept-
ance of the term, but exceptionally high or flood water. 
When such condition exists, the evidence is dear that the 
same run-off can be permitted under respondents' plan to 
go down to the lake as in former conditions without the op-
eration of respondents' plan. It involves what Mr. Richards 
terms a simple problem of regulation, which the State En-
gineer did not deny by any evidence at the trial, could be 
readily made. 
The table on pages 10 and 11 of appellants' brief, pur-
porting to furnish a foundation for a percentage conversion 
of the USGS measurements to measurements at the weir in 
the mouth of American Fork Canyon is wholly misleading. 
By an attempted comparison of peak measurements-one 
a month-taken by different persons at different times, in 
view of the fluctuations of the stream shown by the evidence 
(Tr. 284), a result wholly inconsistent with the facts has 
been arrived at. In other words, by applying the 45% in-
crease which appellants claim the table shows of the lower 
measurements over the upper, to other USGS measurements 
in order to ascertain measurements at the mouth of the 
canyon, we get results wholly at variance with the Searli 
I: 
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reading (upon which very readings appellants have based 
their formula of 45%). For example, which we have taken 
at random, the USGS maximum reading as shown by the 
table on page 8 of appellants brief for May 13, 1944 
was 301 c.f.s. The actual Searle measurments at the mouth 
of canyon on the same day as shown by plaintiffs' exhibit 
L was 224 c.f.s. 
In other words, by applying appellants' formula of 45% 
increase between the Searle lower measurement and the 
USGS measurement, we would get a theoretical flow at 
the mouth of the canyon of 301 c.f.s. plus 135.45, or a total 
of 436.45 c.f.s.; whereas, the Searle measurement on that 
day shows a total flow of 224 second feet in the morning 
and 352 second feet in the afternoon. 
In every case in which a similar test is made, a similar 
or greater divergence will be found. Why is it that the ap-
pellants choose to make such a formula the basis of their 
argument when they have the actual measurement at the 
mouth as shown by plaintiffs' exhibits L and CC? It can-
not be because the Searle measurements are inaccurate, 
since they were admitted without objctieon, and when tested 
on cross-examination, were shown to have been properly 
made, and since appellants use the fragments of the Searle 
figures as the very basis of their false formula. 
The only responsible figures we have for the flow at the 
mouth of the canyon are contained in the Searle figures. 
The data appearing on page 11 of appellants' brief which ig-
nores these data in favor of assumed data as a result of the 
false formula mentioned, is wholly misleading, Moveover, 
appellants have selected only eleven years out of twenty-
two, which are not consecutive years. On the contrary, on 
the same subject, exhibit L shows the following discharge 
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at the mouth of the canyon exceeding 400 c.f.s. in the five 
consecutive years, which is the period covered by plaintiffs' 
exhibit L, and for 1938, plaintiffs' exhibit CC: 
1944-None. (Appellants' assumed table shows 3 
days) 
1945- 1. (No figure in appellants' assumed table) 
1946-None. (No figures in appellants' assumed table) 
1947-None. (Appellants' assumed table shows 6 
days) 
1948- 10. (Appellants' assumed figure shows 16 
days) 
1949- 3. (No figures this late in appellants' as-
sumed table) 
1938- 1. (Appellants' assumed figures purport to 
show 5 days) 
It will be seen that the appellants' argument to defeat 
the change is speculative and largely unsupported. How-
ever, it is apparent that if the change is made, accurate 
measurements-automatic or otherwise----"Can be made so 
that any flow beyond the water respondents have benefi-
cially used can be permitted to go directly into the lake with-
out any effect upon such flow by the proposed change. 
The purported facts on pages 12 and 13 of appellants' 
brief, based also on the false formula of appellants, are like-
wise misleading. Instead of there being for any substantial 
period in excess of 300 second feet flowing at respondents' 
point of diversion, the actual available measurements indi-
cc;_te that a flow in excess of 300 second feet even during 
May or June is quite infrequent, and that it is highly un-
usual for the flow to exceed 350 second feet of water, which 
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the evidence shows has been diverted and beneficially used 
by respondents. 
In any event, whenever the flow, including that held 
back at the proposed reservoir, exceeds the amount of re-
spondents' rights, it can be readily released and will be, and 
under a system of regulation not a tithe as complicated as 
almost any operation by which appellants get their water 
from Utah Lake. 
The inflow figures given on pages 14 to 16 of appel-
lants' brief are relatively meaningless, since Mr. Gardner, 
who made up the figures, testified that no matter when the 
water was applied on the land, it would reach the lake with 
equally beneficial results for appellants, and since the in-
flow figures include considerable water from other sources. 
Appellants make no contention that respondents were 
not the owners of the direct flow rights for which a change 
was sought (Tr. 7-8). 
The Silver Lake Basin area furnishes a natural reser-
voir about fourteen miles upstream from the mouth of 
American Fork Canyon. There is a cut where the moun-
tains come together where the water comes down, and re-
portedly there was once an old dam there at the cut where 
it is proposed to build the new dam (Tr. 22). 
There is a measuring device or scale set up on the res-
pondents' weir in the mouth of American Fork Canyon (Tr. 
31). About 500 second feet can be diverted and measured 
over this weir (Tr. 35). Three hundred second feet of wa-
ter in the early season going over the weir would go into 
plaintiffs' irrigation system (Tr. 35) and even though the 
water overflows the weir, it is picked up and diverted at two 
points below (Tr. 40). The three companies take care of 
between 300 and 350 second feet (Tr. 442). The water that 
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they can't take care of goes down the creek bed (Tr. 42). 
They have diversions right out of the creek bed and take 
more out down there (Tr. 44). When they have as much 
as 500 second feet, they turn it into the creek bed (Tr. 44). 
American Fork has 5,024 acres of first class water, and 
besides this, second and third class rights use high water 
(Tr. 57). From April fifteenth, appellants divert up to 350 
second feet and in the average year this amount is used for 
irrigation (Tr. 58). They use all the water they can get 
in their ditches (Tr. 59). 
In the early season use, the water is scattered over a 
larger area; the late water is confined to a smaller area (Tr. 
60). The late water is used in areas nearer to the lake. 
The early crops are on higher ground and the water is scat-
tered over them in the early season (Tr. 60). 
The maximum flow of water in 194 7 was 159 second 
feet (Tr. 62). Water applied higher up seeps down later 
and is used again for irrigation (Tr. 68). No one has ob-
jected to the diversion and distribution of the water by re-
spondents. None of the appellants has ever objected to the 
respondents' utilization (Tr. 77-78). The only time any-
one ever mentioned respondents' use of water was when 
Mr. Gardner, about four years back, asked why some of 
the water then being used was not permitted to go down 
to the lake (Tr. 82). The land takes more water when it 
is raining. Rain seems to open up the ground (Tr. 83). 
Secondary rights draw water until July and then they 
are cut. There is not enough water the first tum to sup-
ply some of them (Tr. 83). All of the water diverted into 
respondents' system is used for irrigation (Tr. 85). 
Water from North Union Canal gets into respondents' 
waste ditches and also from Lindon area. This water does 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
not come from American Fork River (Tr. 95). Also, Dry 
~eek contributes to waters in that area (Tr. 97). Seepage 
from Provo Reservoir Canal may get into this area (Tr. 
100). 
A. Z. Richards was called and testified in support of 
the application as an expert. He was shown to be an en-
giner of forty-five years experience and specializing as a 
hydraulic engineer for most of this period. He had worked 
for the State Engineer in 1903 and 1904, and ever since has 
had extensive experience in the area involved in this law-
suit. He designed the diversion weir in the mouth of Ameri-
can Fork Canyon as referred to in the evidence (Tr. 116-
117) and had extensive personal experience with the lands 
under the plaintiff companies (Tr. 117). He had also had 
practical experience as a farmer (Tr. 117). 
Mr. Richards explained the general plan of the appli-
cation as follows (Tr. 118-120): 
"Q. Will you explain the practical operation of 
how that storage could be accomplished pursuant to the 
terms of the application as an engineering and hy-
draulic matter? 
"A. The application asked for the privilege of 
storing water that has been used in the past in a moun-
tain reservoir on upper reaches of one of the branches 
of American Fork Creek, and to store it during April 
fifteenth to June fifteenth, a maximum storage stream 
of thirty-five second feet, and in quantity a thousand 
acre feet, to be held back during the highwater period 
and released during the low water period to supple-
ment the water that has been and would be and will be 
applied on the lands at a later date in the year, thereby 
making greater beneficial use of the water. 
"Q. Now is such a project, from an engineering 
and practical standpoint, feasible, and if so, why? 
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"A. In my judgment it is feasible and very well 
planned and should be done. 
"Q. What would be practical operation of such 
a plan, if carried out, with reference to the matter of 
diversion and the other related factors in its practical 
application. 
"A. The diversion of the stream, as it has been 
made in years past, has been by means of an accurate 
measuring device to divide the water between the three 
parties, modified later to divide the water between the 
three parties and American Fork City and the school. 
The weir was so constructed that although there is a 
small part taken out from the large weir it automati-
cally divides it so that this division is as it was before 
the school and the City of American Fork took the 
water. Now, inasmuch as the divisions have been made 
there is no reason why the high water, part of the high 
water that they have used in the past and would be en-
titled to each year according to their method of divid-
ing it, could not be stored in that reservoir, and with-
out interfering with the Utah Power and Light rights 
to put its water through those power plants, both of 
which I am very familiar with, having made a proof on 
both of them, and to so adjust their rights through 
their weir below so that there shouldn't be any inter-
ference as far as taking more water from the creek 
than they would be otherwise entitled to, as I under-
stand the division of the water, if the water was not 
stored. There is no reason why that could not bear-
ranged." 
At the very time of the trial there was a large stream 
of water spilling from Utah Lake into Great Salt Lake. 
There was no beneficial use being made of this water (Tr. 
121). 
Comparatively speaking, the evaporation in Utah Lake 
I: 
I I 
I. 
I'
''. 
;'! 
I. 
: ~~ 
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is considerably more than in the high altitudes at Silver 
Lake Basin; about twice more (Tr. 123). 
The diversion or storage of water under plaintiffs' ap-
plication would not affect the availability of water to irri-
gators from Utah Lake to any substantial degree and it was 
the best judgment of Engineer Richards that there would 
be no detriment or damage to them (Tr. 124). It was fur-
ther the judgment of Mr. Richards that all the water plain-
tiffs' canals will carry has been beneficially used by them 
in the past. 
If the water is held back and used later in the season 
as proposed, there is just as much likelihood that it will 
reach the lake as if it were used with a larger amount 
through the system in the springtime (Tr. 128-129). The 
water later in the year would be used on a reduced acreage 
and loss by transpiration and evaporation would not be so 
great (Tr. 129). 
Utah Lake is a perfect evaporation basin and the loss 
is about 50~,0 (Tr. 134). Graphs in the commissioner's re-
ports show that Utah Lake reached a compromise in the 
last sixty-seven years about 50% of the time (Tr. 135). 
When water from the lake spills, inferior rights would be 
affected (Tr. 136). It seems self-evident that if there were 
any effect upon the Utah Lake rights by the operation of 
plaintiffs' application, inferior rights not involved in this 
case, rather than defendants' rights, would be affected, as-
suming for the sake of argument that Utah Lake was af-
fected at all. 
There would be no practical difficulties which would 
prevent the release of the water from Silver Lake Basin to 
hold the stream up for irrigation in July (Tr. 137). The 
ordinary method usually used on these small mountain res-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
ervoirs in making use of the stored water is that as the nor-
mal flow of the stream recedes, the company releases the 
water from the reservoir and thereby extends the irriga-
tion in a normal way (Tr. 138). 
As. Mr. Richards pointed out, we have problems similar 
to those to be encountered in this application in every irri-
gation district whether the water is stored or not (Tr. 144). 
"Just because of a little difficulty we don't give up on the 
best use of the water" (Tr. 144). Engineer Richards, in 
his approximately forty-five years of experience, didn't 
know of any practice of the State Engineer cutting off the 
right to the use of water merely because it rains (Tr. 145). 
David I. Gardner testified that he was lake commis-
sioner and also one of the expert witnesses for the defend-
ants. He conceded that his report showed that there were 
about 30,000 acre feet of water spilled from Utah Lake dur-
ing the non-irrigation season of 1948 (Tr. 146-147). On 
February twentieth, the gates were open and were closed on 
February twenty-sixth and they were again opened on 
March thirtieth and were not closed until May 4th, 1948. 
During the latter period there were spilled 21,900 acre feet 
of water (Tr. 148). During that period, the volume of flow 
spilled varied between 292 and 397 cubic feet per second 
(Tr. 149). (As against about 22,000 acre feet wasted from 
Utah Lake in one period, respondents wish to conserve 1,000 
acre feet, to release it later in the season when there is a 
greater need and a greater storage capacity in Utah Lake, 
incidentally.) In 1950, the lake commissioner started to 
spill on February fifteenth. The volume was between 200 
and 275 second feet, and at the time of the trial in March, 
1951, about 270 second feet were spilling (Tr. 149). To 
the time of the trial, about 15,000 acre feet had been spilled 
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in 1950 (Tr. 150). About 150 cubic feet was going to Ken-
necott at the time of the trial and in 1950, only 75 second 
feet (Tr. 151). The witness admitted that he testified un-
der oath in a deposition that the water wasted into Great 
Salt Lake was 255 second feet in 1950, less 75 second feet 
going to Kennecott Copper, or a net of 180 second feet be-
ing wasted (Tr. 153). 
It is about 4.1 miles between the lower weir and the 
Geological Survey station (Tr. 190~191). 
As admitted by Lake Commissioner Gardner, besides 
American Fork Creek Battle Creek, Grove Creek, Alpine 
Creek and Fort Canyon Creek, as well as Provo River, 
through the Provo Reservoir Canal, contribute to the in-
flow into Utah Lake at his stations 101 to 115 (Tr. 221-
222). The witness could not tell what part of the inflow 
came from Provo River, and did not know how much wa-
ter had been supplied to this area from Provo Reservoir 
Canal (Tr. 223). 
The peak of the level of water in Utah Lake usually 
is reached in May or June (Tr. 230). Generally speaking, 
the draft on the lake is continued until the latter part of 
September or the middle part of October, so that any water 
entering the lake as inflow up until October of a typical 
year, is contributing to a receding lake (Tr.231). 
While it is impossible to tell the rate of ground water 
movement in the lower area, its rate is about the same, 
whether in May, June or July (Tr. 228). It is not humanly 
possible to tell when ground water percolation would reach 
the lake (Tr. 306). 
During the period May first to October first, the out-
flow from the lake and the evaporation out of the lake are 
about equal in terms of acre feet (Tr. 233). Also, the inflow 
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into the lake and the evaporation during the same period are 
about equal (Tr. 234). The records of the lake commis-
sioner show that in the past thirty-five years for the period 
May first to September thirtieth, the computed evaporation 
in thousand-acre feet has been 231,000, and the inflow from 
all sources 207,000. 
The lake commissioner testified that evaporation from 
a farm surface would be less than from an open water sur-
face (Tr. 238). He added that he would say that evapora-
tion from an open water surface would be greater than both 
evaporation and transpiration from cultivated areas (Tr .. 
239). 
The Silver Lake Basin is on an easterly and southerly 
slope and the snow would melt there more rapidly than on 
a northerly slope (Tr. 240), 
Approximately half of the water that is applied to the 
land in the American Fork River area, ultimately finds its 
way into Utah Lake for the whole period of the year (Tr. 
252). It would be difficult to differentiate between one pe-
riod and another (Tr. 252). Any water that is contributed 
to the lake contributes to its general supply and it makes 
no difference when it comes in (Tr. 253). 
The flow in American Fork Creek would vary very 
much over a day. 
The maximum depth of Utah Lake in general at com-
promise is fourteen feet, but most of the lake is shallower 
(Tr. 298). 
While the lake commissioner did indicate that the rights 
on the lake had not been fully supplied, he did not say that 
the defendants rights had not been, or would not be (Tr. 
314). I , 
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It is about nine or ten miles from the mouth of the can-
yon to Utah Lake (Tr. 318). 
Mr. Gardner based his testimony of damage upon the 
incorrect assumption that no water would be returned from 
the reservoir hold-back (Tr. 247-248), and Mr. Earl errone-
ously assumed that the water held back would be used or 
spread over on the same area as the high water was (Tr. 
335). Mr. Earl demonstrated almost complete unfamili-
arity with the American Fork River and the irrigation sys-
tems lli'1der it (Tr. 342). About the only thing he seemed 
to know definitely about the ditches was "The water is used 
out of them for irrigation. I have observed that." (Tr. 
343). 
Mr. Earl thought it would make no difference in the 
amount of water reaching the lake whether the water was 
applied on a large area or a limited area "so long as it was 
beneficially used" (Tr. 361). Thereafter, it developed that 
the basis of the opinion was so confused and uncertain as 
to completely negative its value (Tr. 363-364). He first said 
it would make no difference how much water was applied 
as far as inflow into the lake was concerned; then that it 
would; then that it would make no difference if the water 
was all held back to September; and then that it would (Tr. 
264-365) . He was unable to support his conclusions 
and the court could hardly have given his testimony 
any weight (Tr. 365-366). 
Mr. Earl further said that an early runoff into the lake 
would be preferable, then indicated that it wouldn't, and 
then said that as long as it got into the lake "early enough" 
it wouldn't make any difference (Tr. 369) .. 
Mr. Richards identified plaintiffs' exhibit EE as a hy-
drograph of the flow of American Fork Creek in 1914 and 
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1938 (Tr. 387-388). The practical operation of the project 
was explained to the court (Tr. 389-390). The exhibit men-
tioned demonstrates a practical manner of accomplishing 
the proposed hold-back (Tr. 389-390). There would be no 
practical difficulty in measuring the inflow into the reser-
voir (Tr. 391). June lOth, 1947, the flow into the proposed 
reservoir site was about 35 second feet; on June nineteenth 
of the same year it was 25 second feet (Tr. 402). While 
there would be some difficulties in the storage plan, these 
would be no different than always encountered in the ad-
ministration of water rights (Tr. 393). A method would 
be used that is common to almost every reservoir. If the 
river is running more than the companies have been using 
in the past, the excess amount must be turned down-stream 
like it would be in any other case where there are rights be-
low entitled to the water (Tr. 393). 
The weir at the mouth of American Fork Canyon is a 
good weir, and an exceptionally good means of measuring 
water (Tr. 3944). 
Reference is made to the graphic chart prepared by Mr. 
Richards to illustrate the evidence in the case and the offi-
cial reports before the court. It was demonstrated that in-
flow based upon high water use of water in the American 
Fork area does not begin until the end of the current irri-
gation season, and that therefore any difference in time 
would in no way prejudice the defendants, and on the con-
trary, would save them evaporation loss for a period. It 
also shows the fluctuations of the lake with reference to 
inflow and evaporation. It is demonstrated that the maxi-
mum inflow into Utah Lake was reached in March of 1939 
before any high water runoff, and that the inflow decreased 
during the entire high water runoff and did not begin to 
I: 
I. 
I l 
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increase again until Septe1nber when the creek flow had de-
creased to 16.8 second feet, or 1,000 acre feet per month. 
This same ground condition occurred each year, showing 
that the great mass of inflow occurred after September first, 
and that holding back from the irrigators' seasonal use 1,000 
acre feet during April and May, and releasing it for use in 
July as is contemplated, will not affect the inflow into the 
lake during the warm months, because the April and May 
water does not increase in flow until September or after-
\Vards. The graphic chart also shows that the lake is at 
its low point ordinarily after October first. Evaporation is 
highest in July and lowest in December and January. The 
lake is at its highest in April and May and the ground water 
inflow is at its peak during the fall and winter months. 
POINTS PRESENTED AND RELIED UPON BY RE-
SPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' 
POSITION: 
I. Respondents may, by a change of the nature of use 
application, acquire the right to temporarily store water 
the direct flow of which has heretofore been appropriated 
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation 
within the same area, when such change can be made with-
out impairing any vested or existing rights, and will serve 
to prevent waste and permit a more beneficial use of the 
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants 
are in no position to complain because frequently they do 
not utilize the rights which they claim might be impaired 
anq must release water which they impound, into Great 
Salt Lake. 
II. The record discloses that the proposed plan for di-
version and storage will not interfere with the rights of the 
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lower users, either as to volume, time of use or otherwise. 
III. The proposed plan of diversion, storage and distri-
bution (1) can be so administered as to insure that the 
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected and if 
affected, that the appellants retain adequate remedies to 
protect their rights; (2) the State Engineer's determination 
that the application cannot be so administered as to avoid 
such injury is not supported by the evidence, has been aban-
doned by the State Engineer through failure to adduce any 
evidence in support thereof and has been properly reversed 
by the findings and judgment of the court based upon the 
evidence and the law; and (3) the State Engineer's decision 
is subject to the findings and judgment of the court on a 
trial de novo as provided by the express terms of the stat-
ute and as required by our system of law. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants at the outset of their argument quote at 
length from the decision of the State Engineer rejecting re-
spondents' application. It is our position that this decision 
has no legal effect because it has been appealed from and 
after trial de novo, the District Court, having jurisdiction, 
has reversed the decision as provided by law and made find-
ings contrary thereto which are binding upon all parties, in-
cluding the State Engineer. 
We will reserve a further discussion of this matter for 
Point III below. It is our position that this decision has no 
persuasive effect because it is unsound both as a matter of 
fact and law and we think this will be shown under Points 
I and II below. 
However, in connection with this decision, at the outset 
we wish to refer to a few significant matters. In quoting 
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the State Engineer's decision on page 21 of their brief, fol-
lowing the sentence "Other flow rights may also be supplied 
in part in this same manner", appellants have omitted the 
sentence in the Engineer's decision reading as follows: 
"However in this instance it has not been shown 
that other flow rights on the source might be adversely 
affected." 
The appellants at the trial put in evidence their pri-
mary claims, subject only to respondents' rights and there 
was no protest or appearance by the owners of various sec-
ondary rights under Utah Lake. It was conceded at the 
trial by appellants and it would follow by the very nature 
of priority that if any users under the Utah Lake might con-
ceivably be affected, they would be the owners of these in-
ferior rights, and there was no showing at any time that the 
appellants would, themselves, suffer any prejudice what-
soever, even though the amount of water in Utah Lake were 
measurably affected, which the evidence showed would not 
be the case. 
It also seems apparent that after writing the decision 
in question, the State Engineer changed his mind about the 
difficulty of administration, upon which fanciful difficulty 
he seemed primarily to base his decision, or that his suc-
cessor in office represented at the trial did not subscribe 
to his views. Thus, while the answer of the Associated Canal 
Companies affirmatively pled that the diversion and storage 
applied for, if attempted, would be impossible of adminis-
tration from the standpoint of use by plaintiffs, the State 
Engineer made no such claim in his answer (R. 89 and 63). 
To the contrary, while the State Engineer was represented 
by counsel at the trial and his chief deputy, F. W. Cottrell, 
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attended the trial (His initials corresponding to the "F.W. 
C." who apparently dictated the State Engineer's original 
decision, R. 55) at no time did the State Engineer's office 
suggest at the trial, or introduce any evidence whatsoever 
in support of the idea, that the office could not administer 
the change and all indications were that after hearing the 
evidence, Mr. Cottrell was convinced that the change could 
be practically administered. 
Indeed, the very basis of the decision must have been 
considered quite far-fetched by the State Engineer after 
mature consideration; we refer particularly to his language: 
"A direct flow user can only use that portion to 
which his right entitles him, subject to the vagaries of 
weather, conditions of crop, etc. . . . . . the ap-
proval of the application granting the right to store 
the water represented by flow rights would impose upon 
an administrator the obligation of determining, as men-
tioned hereinbefore, when weather conditions on the 
ground would or would not permit the use of water by 
diversion in applying it to beneficial use and time when 
the applicant would not or could not, by reason of other 
conditions, use the water in whole or in part by direct 
diversion. This determination from day to day and 
from time to time would impose a practical impossibility 
upon an administrator. . " 
We challenge this entire thesis as being wholly unreal-
istic, impractical and impossible of application. To apply 
such nebulous standards in preventing the recognition of a 
diligence or other right and to assume the burden of reduc-
ing or cutting off water rights from day to day because of 
the vagaries of the weather or according to whether it 
rained or shined or didn't shine, would entangle an adminis-
trator in a hopeless web of confusion and would impeach 
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practically every adjudication of water rights in the history 
of our state. 
Repeatedly, in general adjudications and other adjudi-
cations the court has made specific awards by quantity and 
period of use and on no stream in the state that we know 
of has the State Engineer ever assumed to require a diverter 
to reduce his flow from day to day, according to vagaries 
of the weather. No application could ever be approved and, 
indeed, no appropriation could ever be established if this 
fanciful theory were applied, because the State Engineer 
in practically every case, would have to say that the award 
could not be administered because it would be impractical 
to fluctuate the quantity diverted according to the vagaries 
of the weather. Actually, the evidence showed in this case 
as is pointed out in the Statement of Facts, that in the 
American Fork area no interruption ·in the diversion and 
use of water was indicated during rainy periods and if any-
thing, the ground would absorb more water and the benefit 
from irrigation was more pronounced during this period. 
Be this as it may, the basis on which respondents' appli-
cation was rejected by the State Engineer seems a wholly 
i:r:supportable one. 
Alike fallacious appears the State Engineer's attempt 
to interpret the decided cases. His decision cites only two, 
Tanner v. Humphreys, presumably the one reported in 87 
Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484, and Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et 
al v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135 
P.2d 108. Neither decision seems to support the conclu-
sions of the State Engineer and on the contrary, both indi-
cate a contrary conclusion. 
In the Tanner case, supra, George M. Bacon, predeces-
sor in office ofT. H. Humphreys, State Engineer, rejected 
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the application of Esthma Tanner to change the point of 
diversion of certain water of Provo Canyon. Mr. Bacon 
had stated in his letter of rejection as follows: (The lang-
uage closely following the reasons assigned in the instant 
ca£e.) 
"It would appear that this application goes way 
beyond the usual allowance in the matter of changing 
place and nature of use and is a definite enlargement 
of usual right. The original right would primarily for 
irrigation with the provision for culinary and domestic 
use connected therewith. Any use for domestic and 
municipal purposes in the non-irrigation season is limi-
ted by the court's decree and the requirement of this 
office to that quantity which would be required for do-
mestic and culinary purposes in non-irrigation seasons 
in connection with the use of the balance of the right 
for irrigation purposes." 
On such reasoning, Mr. Bacon rejected the application 
for a change of an irrigation right to a culinary right, and 
an appeal was taken to the District Court. The case is fur-
ther interesting because there, too, the successor in office 
to the one making the decision in the State Engineer's of-
fice was defendant on the appeal, and there was a like 
change in personnel in the instant case between the State 
Engineer's decision and his appearance in the District Court. 
The District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah 
upheld the decision of the State Engineer and granted a non-
suit against Esthma Tanner but the Supreme Court reversed 
the decision and sent the case back for re-trial, upon which 
new trial the application was approved, thus permitting the 
more beneficial use of water in accordance with the policy 
of this state. Incidentally, the form of the approval of the 
District Court upon the re-trial was substantially the same 
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as the form of the decree in the instant case and subjected 
the approval to the existing rights of the parties and with-
out prejudice to the rights of any and all of the parties to 
challenge the nature and extent of, or limitation upon, or 
the use of any of the water rights of said parties in and to 
the waters of Provo River. 
The Supreme Court decision laid down the rule that in 
proceedings to change the point of diversion and nature of 
use of a water right the plaintiff was entitled to have her 
application granted if the point of diversion and nature of 
use could be changed without affecting the vested rights 
of the defendant, or if a decree could be made containing 
conditions which would safeguard the rights of the defend-
ant; that plaintiff was not required to introduce evidence 
that there was unappropriated waters in the tributaries 
from which the diversion was sought or that there was suf-
ficient water in the tributaries to make an exchange since 
the plaintiff would be permitted to divert only as much wa-
ter as she was entitled to have by-passed on her account at 
defendant's dam, and that it was not necessary for the ap-
plicant to make a showing that the water right had been 
beneficially used but it would be assumed that the water 
that had been used upon the land for which it was diverted 
had been beneficially used. Implicit in the opinion of this 
court is the further proposition that even though the appli-
cant could not show a right to the use of all of the water 
that she sought to change, yet her application should be 
granted so that she could change, under her application, 
such right as she might have. 
The case of Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et al v. Kents 
Lake and Reservoir Co., et al, supra, which is the only other 
case cited by the State Engineer, negatives another propo-
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sition which seems to be a basis of the Engineer's decision. 
It was argued that the application should not be approved 
since it would place the applicant in a position to impair 
the rights of others if it did not administer the change prop-
erly. The Supreme Court said in response to such a con-
tention: 
"In the light of our policy of encouraging the de-
velopment of water right and the putting of water to 
a beneficial use, we should not deny this application 
simply because it puts Kents Lake in a position, as the 
upstream junior appropriator, where it might, when 
sufficient water was not available for all concerned, 
interfere with the plaintiff's rights . . . . ." 
By way of summation upon this phase, occasioned by 
the setting out of the decision of the State Engineer in ap-
pellants' brief, it appears that the decision of the State En-
gineer should have been superceded by a judicial determina-
tion. It has been so superceded. We now proceed to the 
points indicating that the judicial determinaion of the Dis-
trict Court was correct and that it should stand wihout ref-
erence to the initial decision of the State Engineer. 
Point I. Respondents may by a change of nature -~of 
use application acquire the right to temporarily store water 
the dir~t flow of which has been appropriated heretofore 
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation 
within the same area, when such change can be made with-
out impairing any vested or existing rights and will serve 
to prevent waste and pennit a more beneficial use of the 
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants 
are in no position to complain becaus.e frequently they are 
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not able to utilize the right which they claim might be im-
paired. 
The argument of appellants seems to be that respond-
ents' application for storage is really not a change applica-
tion but an application to appropriate, and cannot be gran-
ted in its present form. Sec. 100-3-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, is cited to the effect that storage of water by 
means of a reservoir shall be regarded as a diversion. Gran-
ted that there may be an original application to appropriate 
water by means of storage, this does not mean that a di-
rect flow right cannot be changed to a storage right without 
being an original appropriation any more than it means that 
a direct flow right for one use cannot be changed to a di-
rect flow right for another use without it being deemed an 
o:dginal appropriation. Granted too, that the water right 
caneot be enlarged by means of a change application, yet 
by the very nature of the change application, it can be 
changed and a different use or a different manner of use 
adopted. That is the very purpose of a change application. 
No enlargement of any right is sought by respondents; 
the State Engineer, as well as all of the defendants before 
the District Court, conceded that the respondents had a pri-
mary right to substantially all of the flow of American Fork 
River, at least with the exception of extremely high water. 
The purpose of the application is simply to change the na-
ture of use of a small quantity of that water and the change 
is limited to that water which the respondents have, for 
more than sixty years, beneficially used and through such 
beneficial use, have heretofore appropriated. 
Sec. 100-3-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides that: 
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"Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use and may use the 
water for other purposes than those for which it was 
originally appropriated, but no such change shall be 
made if it impairs any vested rights without just com-
pensation." 
Appellants cite the opinion of Justice Wolfe in Moyle, 
et al v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201,176 P.2d 882. The ma-
jority of the Court in that case determined that in a con-
demnation of proceeding the owner of a water right was en-
titled to its valuation on the basis of its highest and best 
use, independent of any change application. The dissenting 
opinion itself recognized the basis of respondents' rights 
here, inasmuch as it is implicit in that opinion that by means 
of a change application, right to a new phase of use which 
may be entirely different from that upon which the original 
appropriation is based, may be acquired through filing an 
application with the State Engineer subject only to existing 
rights. 
Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484, supra, 
as stated by the Court (p. 485) involved the rejection of an 
application by the State Engineer, "Requesting the permis-
sion to change the place and nature of use of a decreed wa-
ter right on Provo River." While in effect an exchange of 
water was contemplated, the change application was deemed 
entirely appropriate. 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Co., et al v. Kents Lake Reser-
voir Co., et al, 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108, supra, involved 
an application to change the place of storage out of previ-
ously awarded senior storage rights and also an application 
to appropriate allegedly unappropriated water. Nothing is 
sought in respondents' application that cannot be accom-
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plished by a change in the nature and use and the applica-
tion clearly states the change contemplated. As indicated 
in Tanner v. Humphreys, supra, it is no reason for de-
nying the application that the applicant may nat have all 
the water it claims since the change can be made out of the 
water right it does have. 
Appellants are disturbed about the introduction of the 
evidence which shows that over the period for which data 
is available, by reason of the limited storage capacity of 
Utah Lake during the high-water period, substantial quan-
tities of water have had to be released from Utah Lake and 
wasted into Great Salt Lake for 50% of these years, and 
particularly that during the past few years, large quanti-
ties of water, many times the amount sought to be held 
back, have had to be wasted into Great Salt Lake because 
of excess early inflow into the lake. They say that such 
wastage is beyond their control and pursuant to a court de-
cree establishing compromise point. They argue that by 
showing this wastage, respondents are seeking to make an 
original appropriation thereof or accomplish an exchange. 
It may be granted that this wastage is beyond appel-
lants' control; nevertheless, it is a fact that huge quantities 
of water are wasted into Great Salt Lake during the early 
run-off period which quantities dwarf respondents' proposed 
hold-back without even considering the contemplated later 
release of the water to the area in question. But respond-
ents are not proposing to appropriate such wastage; they 
are merely pointing out that appellants are in no position 
to object to the proposed change under any theory, at least 
during the time such wastage is being carried on, or when 
such wastage affects the supply in Utah Lake during any 
hold-back in the high-water season in which accretions to 
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th2 lake are being wasted into the Great Salt Lake. There 
can be no interference with plaintiffs' rights under the claim 
that the inflow during such period was. thereby affected, no 
matter how fanciful such claim might be, and the change 
could thus be made without a semblance of a claim that 
their vested or other rights would be impaired. 
This point could more properly be discussed under the 
next heading involving the question of the claimed impair-
ment of vested rights, but since appellants mentioned it un-
der the division corresponding to the present point, we re-
fer to it here. It is no doubt mentioned by appellants in 
support of their contention that respondents' application 
is not in fact a change application. It ·must be apparent, 
however, that respondents are not seeking to appropriate 
the thousands upon thousands of acre feet that are wasted 
annually into Great Salt Lake since the change is limited 
to that flow of water which respondents themselves have 
beneficially used and which, to the extent of 1,000 acre feet 
annually, they seek to temporarily hold back. 
AJppellants intimate that the court granted the appli-
cation of respondents solely by reason of such wastage. 
This, of course, is not the case, as a reference to the evidence 
and the finding~ will clearly indicate; because, apart from 
this wastage, it is apparent that the proposed hold-back 
would impair in no sense any vested or existing right of the 
appellants; but on this point, it is also apparent that there 
could be no possible justification for the outright rejection 
of appellants' application, since during such period as the 
wastage occurs, there would be no reason at all why the 
proposed change should not be allowed. For example, as-
suming that the capacity of Utah Lake was such that dur-
ing all of April, May and June, instead of during a part of 
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that period, all of the inflow into Utah Lake would have to 
be turned out and wasted into Great Salt Lake by reason 
of limited capacity. Would anyone contend that appellants 
could object to the respondents' hold-back of their own wa-
ter during such period in order to permit its more beneficial 
use? This is only one minor phase of the case, but it neve-
theless is another indication why respondents' application 
should be granted in the interest of a more beneficial utili-
zation of their own water right. 
It has been announced repeatedly, not only in courts 
of this state but by the courts of all the western states, that 
the right to the use of water is a property right, with all the 
incidents of ownership and, with such rights, the owner may 
use the same for his own beneficial purposes, limited only 
by the obligation to comply with regufations as to change 
of use through the office of the State Engineer and by his 
duty not to interfere with other vested rights. It is also ele-
mentary that water cannot be applied to irrigation of land 
in the usual way, and the way authorized by law, except 
that of necessity there is seepage and run-off; but that the 
owner of the right is entitled to use the same with reason-
able care without losing his interest or rights to others by 
appropriation, prescription or otherwise. 
Mr. Kinney, in his work on "Irrigation and Water 
Rights," expresses the principle as follows: 
"The authorities hold that while water so denomi-
nated as waste water may be used after it escapes, no 
permanent right can be acquired to have the discharge 
kept up, either by appropriation, or right by prescrip-
tion, estoppel or acquiescence in its use while it is es-
caping, and that even though expensive ditches or 
works are constructed for the purpose of utilizing such 
waste water . . in other words, the original 
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appropriators have the right, and in fact, it is their du-
ty to prevent, as far as possible, all waste of the water 
which they have appropriated." 
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, Vol. 2, par. 661, pp. 
1150-1153; see also par. 1125, p. 2084. 
See also Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867; 
Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. 
Co .. , et al, 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866. 
Incident to right to the use of water is the right to put 
the same to the best possible use, even though such use re-
quires the temporary storage of water from one period to 
another. In discussing that question, Judge Kinney, among 
other things, states: 
"The existence of the right to store water as long 
as it did not interfere with the vested rights of qthers 
has long been recognized in the courts . . . ." 2 
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, par. 844, p. 
1480. 
In this connection he cites the opinion of Judge Gabbert 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, in Seven 
Lakes Res. Co. v. New Loveland & Greeley Irr. & Land Co., 
93 Pac. 485, wherein it is stated: 
"It appears from the record that the stockholders 
of appellant, instead of planting crops which require 
irrigation during the early part of the season, utilize 
their lands by growing crops which do not require ir-
rigation until about August, when the direct supply 
through the ditches is not sufficient to furnish the vol-
ume of water necessary to irrigate such crops. And so, 
instead of applying the water to which they are entitled 
for direct irrigation in the early part of the season, they 
~_;tore this water for use later to mature crops, like beets 
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and potatoes, which do not require irrigation until about 
the month of August. It would be unfortunate indeed 
if the law were such that it could not be adapted to 
changed conditions resulting from the character of 
crops grown by those engaged in agricultural pursuits. 
If water for direct irrigation can only be utilized for 
that purpose, the result would be to retard agricultural 
progress, and limit the growth of agricultural products 
to those which can be matured by means of direct irri-
gation early in the season. If the judgment of the trial 
court should be sustained upon the theory that one own-
ing a priority for direct irrigation may not cease to 
utilize it for the purpose upon crops in May, June and 
July, and store it for use during the same season there-
after, the result would be to take from the owner of 
such a priority his rights and confer them upon others 
growing crops of a different nature. Such a rule would 
make the right to the use of water dependent upon the. 
character of crops grown insted of upon the right to 
utilize it in any manner which does not injuriously af-
fect the vested rights of others." 
The same principle is enunciated in the case of Greeley 
Loveland Irr. Co. et al v. Farmers' Pawnee Ditch C'o., 146 
Pac. 247, particularly at 252. These decisions have been 
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of this state 
in the case of Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal 
Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852. In the course of the opin-
ion, Harold M. Stevens, speaking for the Supreme Court of 
this state, among other things, said: 
"With respect to the second theory advanced by 
respondents it is undoubtedly true that a distinction 
may be drawn between direct irrigation for immediate 
use on the one hand and storage for future use on the 
other. Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2nd 
Ed., para. 844, and the right of the owner of a priority 
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for direct irrigation to store his water for later season-
al use has been sustained. Seven Lakes Res. Co. v. 
New Loveland and Greeley Irr. and Land Co., 40 Colo. 
382, 93 Pac. 485, 17 LRS (NS) 329 and see note to Wa-
ter Supply and Storage Co. v. Larimer and Wells Irri-
gation Co., (Colo) 46 LRA 322. Such right to change 
the purpose of use is to be sustained as is the right to 
change the means of use, place of use and point of di-
version upon the theory that the right of enjoyment 
is independent of the mode but it is well settled and en-
tirely elementary that all changes in the mode of en-
joyment must in no event violate the maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas. 
"That qualification is plainly set forth in Seven 
Lakes Res. Co. v. New Loveland and Greeley Irr. and 
Land Co., cited supra, where at page 331 of 17 LRA 
(NS), the Justice in delivering the opinion of the court 
said, 'A priority to the use of water is a proprty right, 
which is the subject of purchase and sale, and its char-
acter and method of use may be changed, providing 
that such change does not injuriously affect the rights 
of others.' " 
Sec. 100-11-1, UCA, 1943, declares that the policy of 
the state is to obtain from water in Utah the highest duty 
for domestic uses and irrigation of lands in Utah within the 
terms of interstate compacts or otherwise. The other cases 
cited by appellants negative neither the right to make a 
change under the form of application filed by respondents, 
nor the duty of the State Engineer to approve such change. 
The case of Eardley v. Terry, et al, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 
362, is cited by appellants for the proposition that the Dis-
trict Court which hears the matter de novo can do no more 
than the State Engineer. In the instant case, the District 
Court did exactly what the State Engineer had the power 
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to do, and we submit had the duty to do. The Eardley case 
further shows that in acting upon an application to approp-
riate water, the State Engineer should, and if he fails to do 
so, the court will, approve the application if there is reason-
able prospect that the appropriation can be effected in the 
future without detriment to existing rights; and that the 
beneficial use of water is so important that doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the applicant. 
Appellants contended at the trial that there was a dif-
ferent rule applying to change applications; that the proof 
must negative any possibility of detriment, however minor. 
In its brief before this Court, it adds the further proposition 
that even then, if the State Engineer has denied a change 
application on a question of fact, such decision is binding on 
the District Court in effect. Both interpretations seem 
wholly unsupported under the statutes, as well as in view 
of the decisions of this Court. 
Sec. 100-3-8, UCA, 1943, provides for the approval or 
rejection of both original applications to appropriate, and 
change applications, outlining the duty of the State En-
gineer with respect to both. They are considered on the 
same basis in the statute. Every reason for encouraging 
the utilization of unappropriated water applies to the more 
beneficial use of water that has already been appropriated. 
The same principle is specifically applied to change ap-
plication in the case of Tanner v. Humphreys, supra. In 
doubtful cases it has been held that an application to ap-
propriate should be approved, since the policy of the law is 
to prevent waste and to promote the largest beneficial use 
of water. Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 
243, 289 Pac. 116. The Kimball and Terry cases cited above 
were followed and approved in Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents 
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Lake & Res. Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108, rehearing de-
nied 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638, and in Whitmore v. Welch, 
___ Utah , 201 P.2d 954. 
Unless there is no reasonable probability that the 
change can be affected without impairing the vested or ex-
isting rights of others, the change should be allowed. The 
change in the case at bar has been allowed by the District 
Court on a trial de novo sitting as a court of equity, which 
had the opportunity of observing and hearing first~hand all 
of the testimony in the case and which, upon the great pre-
ponderance of the evidence, has found that the change can 
be effected and administered without detriment to existing 
or vested rights. 
Point II. The recQrd discloses that the proposed plan 
for diversion and sto.rage would not interfere with the rights 
of the lower users either as to volume, time of use or other-
wise. 
A. Z. Richards, an engineer of extensive knowledge and 
experience, not only involving irrigation problems generally, 
but involving the specific area in question, testified after 
explaining the proposed plan in detail, that in his judgment 
it was feasible and very well planned (Tr. 119). He further 
testified that the diversion and the storage of water under 
the application would not affect the availability of water to 
irrigators from Utah Lake to any substantial degree, and 
it was his best judgment that there would be no detriment 
or damage to them (Tr. 124); that if the water is held and 
used later in the season as proposed there is just as much 
likelihood that it will reach the lake as if it were used with 
a larger amount through the same system earlier in the 
season (Tr. 128-129); that the water later in the year would 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
be used on a reduced acreage and loss by transpiration and 
evaporation would not be so great (Tr. 129). It further ap-
peared that if there were any theoretical effect upon the 
lake from the operation of the proposed plan under any con-
ceivable theory, inferior rights and not defendants' rights 
would be affected (Tr. 136). 
The only other experts appearing were Mr. Gardner and 
Mr. Earl. As pointed out heretofore, Mr. Earl's lack of 
knowledge concerning the area involved and his confusing 
and conflicting testimony make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to give any weight thereto. 
Upon the basis of Mr. Gardner's testimony alone---and 
he, too, was a witness for appellants-it became clear that 
there would be no detriment to appellants by reason of the 
proposed change. His testimony that the hold-back would 
affect Utah Lake was based on the assumption that there 
would be no release of the water from the Silver Lake Basin 
reservoir, which assumption, of course, was contrary to the 
basic plan of the application and not justified by the evi-
dence. He testified that he understood from the questions 
put to him that if 35 second feet of water were held in Silver 
Lake Basin indefinitely, there would be a loss to Utah Lake 
(Tr. 248) and he stated that he did not understand that Mr. 
Mulliner's question also involved the release of water (Tr. 
247). He further expressly stated that he would not at-
tempt to answer the percentage of loss if the water were 
withheld a month or so (Tr. 249) and he stated that if it 
were held back in June and released in July, the loss wouldn't 
be "too great" (Tr. 250). It wouldn't be "too substantial" 
(Tr. 250). 
He summarized the entire matter when he stated that 
he would say from his experience and schooling "that ap-
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proximately half of the water that is applied to the land ul-
timately finds its way into Utah Lake for the whole period 
of .the year" (Tr. 252). He further stated that it would be 
difficult to differentiate between one period and another (Tr. 
252; that he had no judgment as to the rate of the ground 
water movement (Tr. 252) but that the loss to the ground 
water would be small (Tr. 253). The fair intendment of his 
testimony was that no matter when the water was applied, 
about 50% would ultimately reach the lake and as far as 
the quantity reaching the lake was concerned it would make 
no difference as to whether it was applied in one month or 
another. He further testified that any water that is con-
tributed to the lake, contrn:mtes to the general supply and 
he didn't see that it made any difference when it came in. 
"Utah Lake has a certain supply to meet and whether it 
comes in May, June, July or August, there still has to be 
that much water in the lake to supply it" (Tr. 253). He 
thought it would be preferable to have the accretion come 
in late in the season and not be subject to evaporation be-
fore the maximum drain-off occurred (Tr. 254). 
It thus is apparent that any hold-back would contribute 
to the lake to substantially the same extent as if there were 
no hold-back and that as a matter of fact, a later accretion 
would be just as advantageous to the lower users, if not more 
so. This fact is borne out by the graphs shown in the record 
indicating the highest level of the lake occurs about May 
and that the bottom draw-off is reached sometime near 
October first, when use for irrigation has been substantially 
completed. 
It was shown by Mr. Richards' testimony that the hea-
vy run-off in the spring even under normal use and without 
the hold-back does not commence to reach the lake until 
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about the close of the irrigation season. The hold-over sup-
ply in the lake is just as important, or more so, than the sup-
ply during the summer, since there is never any assurance 
as to what the next year will bring, and particularly during 
a high run-off period, the uncertainties as to the next year 
are a controlling matter. 
Appellants express concern, although inferentially con-
ceding that any effect upon the lake by the proposed appli-
cation would be insubstantial, by saying that if such effect 
were multiplied, it would become important. We believe 
that the change application could be multiplied indefinitely 
and the amount of usable water in the lake would not be sub- , 
stantially affected. Loss by evaporation might be reduced 
and waste into Grea~ Salt Lake might be minimized. Neither 
of these results would detrimentally affect any vested right. 
Appellants' objection to the instant application would 
b2 alike unjustified with respect to other applications; but 
after all, each case must rest upon its own bottom and upon 
the evidence before the court. The granting of the change 
would in no wise preclude the appellants from the protection 
of their rights should the application be administered so as 
to cause detriment. It is abundantly shown that it need not 
be so administered and under the plan of the respondents 
would not be so administered. 
The comment in the Kents Lake case is particularly ap-
plicable to the appellants' argument. "In the light of our 
policy of encouraging the development of water rights and 
the putting of water to a beneficial use, we should not deny 
this application merely because it puts Kents Lake in a po-
sition, as the upstream appropriator, where it might, when 
sufficient water was not available for all concerned, inter-
fere with the plaintiff's rights." 
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The appellants express concern about the mechanics of 
the administration. Mr. Richards, an irrigation engineer of 
large experience, rightly pointed out that there were diffi-
culties in the administration of any water right, but that 
there were no difficulties here which were not encountered 
in any program of storage. If such difficulties were a rea-
son for denying the greatest beneficial use of water, this re-
gion would have remained arid and the development of water 
rlghts in this state, and our economy, would have been hope-
lessly retarded. The problem of holding back a thousand 
acre feet in the reservoir, subject to measure by automatic 
recording device or otherwise, and the release and utilization 
of such water at a later date for use within the same area, 
is one of ordinary water administration. If at any time, due 
to excessive snow or otherwise, a somewhat excessive quan-
tity of water should be held back on occasion for a day or 
so, it would be a simple matter to turn down into the lake 
out of the conceded rights of respondents a sufficient amount 
of water to make that quantity up. No water distribution 
is accomplished with the mathematical exactness which ap-
pellants seek to establish as a standard. Their own storage 
problems could not be solved under such a standard, nor un-
der such standard would the most simple direct flow use 
prove feasible. 
All of the objections, we believe, are in the fertile im-
agination of counsel and do not arise out of the evidence and 
are not justified by it. The State Engineer made no show-
ing at the trial as to any difficulty of administration and 
claimed none in his pleadings, and we think it is reasonable 
to suppose from the evidence that the successor in office of 
the engineer who denied the application does not concur in 
the idea his predecessor had in this respect. At least, there 
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was nothing which was made to appear in the evidence which 
refutes this asumption. 
On page 44 of appellants' brief it is claimed that "Under 
the change application here, the water withheld in any cal-
endar year need not be released in that year at all." This 
is typical of the calibre of the objections appellants have in-
terposed. The proposed change can be so administered as 
to prevent detriment to vested rights, and it should be ap-
proved, notwithstanding that conceivably, under some far-
fetched assumption, it might put the respondents in a po-
sition to interfere with the rights of others. But the appli-
caion fairly shows on its face that it is for only a seasonal 
storage. If and when appellants' rights are invaded by such 
an unusual interpretation, they will have their full remedy, 
not only under the law as established by repeated decisions, 
including the Eardley v. Terry case, supra, but also by the 
e_:press terms of the judgment itself. 
We call attention to defendants' exhibit 14, which con-
tained forms of approval already issued by the State En-
gineer on certificates of appropriation or change certificates 
in appellants' favor. It is clear that in the instant case, the 
District Court ordered plaintiffs' application approved in the 
usual form. Thus, even Kennecott Copper Corporation's 
final change certificate No. A-110 provides that the rights 
evidenced by this certificate are restricted to the change of 
place and nature of use and in no way establish or validate 
the water rights claimed by applicant. The last certificate 
contained in exhibit 14 provides that the State Engineer cer-
tified that said appropriator is entitled to change the place 
and purpose of use of water as therein set out, "subject to 
prior rights, if any, and including those junior to the origi-
nal aplication . " 
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Respondents' change application having been approved, 
they are in a position to proceed with the actual change and 
upon submitting their proof, and it appearing that no detri-
ment has been suffered by the appellants or others, a sim-
ilar certificate of change wil be issued. None of the appel-
lants' rights can in any way be prejudiced. As pointed out 
heretofore, the evidence indicates that there are rights un-
der Utah Lake inferior to those of appellants. These rights 
have made no protest and there was no showing as to any 
detrimental effect that the change would have on them. 
Rights, if any, that would be affected at all would be these 
inferior to appellants' rights. In fact, in the brief of appel-
lants, these inferior rights, not represented in the case, are 
mentioned, and imaginary effects upon them conjured up. 
Attention is called to the case of Whitmore v. Welch, supra, 
wherein the trial court, in holding that the applications in 
question should be granted, made it subject to the condition 
that the rights of another applicant, not directly involved 
in the suit should be determined. The Supreme Court held 
that this condition in the judgment was "unwarranted". 
Again, we come to the fact that the appellants, while 
claiming mere possibilities of detriment, attempt to avoid the 
effect of their wastage of water into Great Salt Lake. While 
attempting to hold the respondents to the strict rule of the 
limitation of water rights by day to day changes in the 
weather, they assert, in effect, that there are no limita-
tions upon their own right, including the limitation of bene-
ficial use. 
It has been repeatedly declared in the Utah cases that 
in this arid region, water is too valuable to permit unneces-
sary waste. No water that is sought to be applied to a bene-
ficial use or purpose should be permitted to go to waste un-
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less it cannot be so applied without interfering with the prior 
rights of other users. Salt Lake City, et al v. Gardner, 39 
Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147. 
No one can acquire a vested right to waste water. It 
is of the utmost importance to remember that no one can 
acquire an absolute right to waste water as he can to other 
property. A person having title to property generally may 
waste it or destroy it, but he may not do so with water. Eden 
Irr. Co. v. District Court of Weber County, 61 Utah 103, 211 
Pac. 957. 
To make waste the subject of inquiry in every adjudi-
cation would injure no person in his rights, for no one can 
have a right to waste water, and it would aid in bringing 
about the largest possible beneficial use of the water of the 
state. Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, Judge, 
70 Utah 239, 259 Pac. 408. 
Sec. 100-1-3, UCA, 1943, provides that the beneficial use 
of water shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all 
rights to the use of water in this state. 
Mere assertions of possible detriment should not prevent 
'a beneficial change. We quote from Sec. 873, p. 1538, Vol. 2, 
Kinney on Irrigation & Water Rights, under the heading, 
"The Nature and Extent of Injuries to Others Which Will 
Prevent Changes": 
"A water right being a property right of the high-
est order, its owner may do what he wishes with his 
own including the making of such changes as he sees fit 
to make provided that he does not materially injure the 
rights of others in making them. It is evident that no 
rule can be laid down which can govern every rule at-
tempted but that whether the change should or should 
not be allowed is a question of fact and is to be deter-
mined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding 
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each particular case. The principal question to be de-
termined in cases of this nature is whether or not any 
other appropriators' rights are injured by the change. 
The restriction to the right to the change that others 
must not be injured by the change is a matter of de-
fense; and therefore the burden of proof showing that 
injuries have been done to the rights of others is upon 
the one seeking an damages and injuries actually com-
mitted or seeking an injunction against contemplated in-
juries. There is no presumption that a greater quantity 
of water was diverted or is about to be diverted after the 
change than was diverted before, even if the water is 
used to irrigate a greater acreage after the change than 
if irrigated before; nor under this state of facts will it 
be presumed that the vested rights of others have been 
or will be injured by the change; injury to the rights of 
others must be proven as is any other fact by the party 
alleging the injury." 
See also Tanner v. Humphreys, supra, and Eardley v. 
Terry, supra. 
Substantial injury is required to prevent a change; not 
a mere speculative injury, but one real and actual. No such 
prospective injury appears. No injury has been shown un-
less by some extraordinary or unusual administration re-
spondents infringe upon appellants' rights, beyond the neces-
sary scope of their plan. This they do not intend to do. If 
they do, the law and the court's judgment itself afford ap-
pellants adequate remedy. If they do not, they should be 
permitted to attempt a more beneficial utilization of their 
own water rights, not only in their own interests but in fur-
therance of the public policy of this state. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
Point Ill. The pro~ plan of div.ersion, storage and 
distribution can be so administered as to insure that the 
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected. The 
State Engineer's assertion in his decision that it cannot be 
so administered as to avoid such injury is not supported by 
the evidence, has been abandoned by the State Engineer 
through failure to adduce any evidence in support the,reof, 
has been properly overcome by the findings and judgment of 
the triaJ court based on the evidence, and is subject to the 
findings and judgment of the court on the trial de novo. 
The appellants refer to the history of control of water 
rights through the State Engineer's office and seek to place 
respondents in the position of denying the proper authority 
of the State Engineer. Thus on p. 46 of their brief they 
state, "Dealing with the claim of respondents that they have 
the right to and can administer this water as was largely 
done when water was regulated by court decrees alone .... " 
and on page 51, "The respondents' contention on this, as 
adopted in the findings are, first: that they own and have a 
right to control and administer the waters of American Fork 
Creek . . ." It is true that respondents claim and are 
entitled to the right to the use of the waters of the Ameri-
can Fork Creek to the full extent of their diligence approp-
riation, subject to the State Engineer's proper jurisdiction 
and in accordance with law. The facts that respondents filed 
their application for change with the State Engineer and in 
accordance with law, appealed the decision to the District 
Court, relying upon their rights under the law, indicate their 
position. The findings of the court speak for themselves to 
d2ny the unjustified interpretation of appellants. 
Respondents further deny the proposition advanced by 
appellants-a proposition not justified by the laws of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 
State of Utah nor as conceded by appellants by any adjudi-
cated cases-that when the State Engineer made his initial 
determination denying an application such determination 
must stand, and is binding upon the courts, despite proced-
ures for review through a trial de novo. Such a proposition . 
is repugnant to our entire system of water control, as well as 
to our fundamental concepts involving the judicial power. 
It is further directly opposed to the express provisions of the 
statutes. 
In attempting to follow appellants' devious argument, 
we note their inference that upon this change being granted, 
the rights of respondents will initially come under the juris-
diction of the State Engineer. The fact is that respondents' 
rights have been under that jurisdiction for many years past 
in the operation of their existing system, and. the regulations 
and control of that office will be no different by reason of 
the fact that a small storage reservoir is established. Appel-
lants infer that the State Engineer upon the granting of the 
change applicaion will have the duty of minutely following 
each development to assure that no drop of water is mis-
placed. By the same token, it may be argued that under the 
existing irrigation system of respondents the State Engineer 
must follow each stream of water every day, depending up-
on the vagaries of the weather and must determine that it 
is not applied upon bench land when it should be applied a 
rod or so, or a mile or so further down. 
The proposed change can be administered like any other 
right under the jurisdiction of the State Engineer and there 
are no more difficulties inherent in the administration of the 
change than there have been for many years in the admin-
istration of the waters of American Fork River. These 
have involved the diversion, control and distribution 
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of the river between these companies and other interested 
usrs, and the return flow, if any, into Utah Lake as it is af-
fected by such distribution. How have the appellants or the 
State Engineer determined in the past that the respondents 
have not diverted from the natural channel more water than 
they are entitled to, and how will they so determine that fact 
in the future? It will be no more complicated an adminis-
trative problem with the change granted than it would be 
otherwise, and in fact, because of the additional measuring 
devices that will be required, a closer control will be more 
readily possible. All of the fancied difficulties in measuring 
and checking the Silver Lake hold-back have been, and will 
be, present to a greater or less extent in any irrigation pro-
j2ct. The difficulties will be infinitely less than on numer-
ous other irrigation systems. The distribution of the waters 
of Utah Lake itself are an example of a most complex one, 
where the idea of exactness in diversion would be deemed 
fantastic and where theoretical objections must give way to 
practical formula to permit the beneficial use of water. Deer 
Creek, involving repeated hold-backs and subsequent release 
d2mands by a large number of irrigation companies could 
not operate at all under the limitations and standards sought 
to be applied by appellants as against the respondents. There 
is not a single stream in the state furnishing water to more 
than a few irrigators which does not involve problems which, 
measured by these . impractical standards, would be in-
surmountable. 
We have already pointed out the testimony before the 
court showing the practical operation of the planned hold-
back and the complete absence of testimony on the part of 
the State Engineer as to the impracticability of administra-
tion. Nevertheless, the appellants finally urge that the 
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State Engineer, as an administrative officer in making the 
determination that the application should be rejected for 
the reason that it would be allegedly impractical of admin-
istration, has established a decision which the court, irre-
spective of the evidence before it, is powerless to disturb. 
This contention may be gilded as it is in the brief by schol-
arly references to the theory of state administration and 
the knowledge and experience of the State Engineer. but 
the fact remains that the statute provides expressly for the 
power to decide in a trial de novo that which the appellants 
contend against, and the decisions of this court lend no 
support to the thought that the statues can be disregarded. 
Referring in great length to other statutes and other 
statutory principles and systems having no bearing upon the 
problem, appellants in only a cursory manner mention the 
statutes involved here. It is not necessary, as appellants 
have done, to seek in the general authorities or statutes and 
cases governing certiorari or similar extraordinary proceed-
ings the rules determining the powers of the District Court 
on a trial de novo in reviewing a decision of the State En-
gineer. The answer is in the water law itself, made doubly 
clear by the decided cases, and he who runs may read. 
Section 100-3-14, UCA, 1943, concerning "Review by 
Courts of Engineer's Decisions," provides: 
"In any case where a decision of the state engineer 
is involved any persan aggrieved by such decision may 
within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil ac-
tion in the district court for a plenary review thereof. 
The state engineer shall give notice of his decision by 
mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to the applicant 
and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to 
have been given on the date of mailing. The place of 
trial, subject to the power of the court to change the 
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same as provided by law, shall be in the county in which 
the stream or water source, or some part thereof, is lo-
cated. The state engineer must be joined as a defand-
ant in all suits to review his decisions, but no judgment 
for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be rendered 
against him. Parties shall be served with process as in 
other cases and notice of the pendency of such action 
shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with 
the state engineer within twenty days after the same 
is commenced which shall operate to stay all further 
proceedings pending the decision of the district court." 
Section 100-3-15, UCA, 1943, further dealing with the 
review by trial de novo, continues: 
"The pleadings, practice and procedure in suits to 
review decisions of the state engineer shall be the same 
as in other equity cases. The hearing in the district 
court shall proceed as a trial de novo and shall be tried 
to the court as other equitable actions. Within ten 
days after its entry a copy of the judgment shall be 
transmitted by the clerk of the district court to the of-
fice of the state engineer. An action to review a de-
cision of the state engineer shall be dismissed upon ap-
plication of any party or the court on its own motion 
if the complaint was not filed or the summons was not 
served within sixty days after notice of the decision 
, 
Appellants do not expressly say that the decision of the 
State Engineer cannot be reviewed under any circumstances, 
but they argue that on fact questions his decision is entitled 
to great weight, if indeed it is not controlling. Then they 
approach their inferred conclusion from a different angle 
by urging that on the question of whether the plan is feas-
ible or could be administered the decision is conclusive, since 
the engineer is in a better position to know, than the court. 
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We deny the later premise as well as the other propositions 
advanced by appellants. When the court has the benefit, 
not only of all the data available to the State Engineer or 
his deputy who formulated the decision, but of all data avail-
able to all of the other parties and their witnesses collect-
ively, we believe it is in a much better position than the 
State Engineer to make a fair and complete determination. 
Particularly does this seem true, where as here, apparently 
the basis of the State Engineer's original determination was 
so insupportable that he made no showing in justification of 
his judgment before the District Court although properly 
summoned and appearing as a party. But be this as it may, 
and no matter how much the State Engineer might have 
contributed to the knowledge of the court, the fact is that 
upon the appeal, the decision was the court's responsibility 
and that decision is not only binding upon the State Engineer 
but upon the parties here, subject only to a review by this 
Court in the manner provided for the review of other equi-
table actions. 
The appellants' argument emphasizes the particular 
qualification of the State Engineer to know whether the plan 
is feasible. The same thing might be said about his qualifi-
cation to know whether there is any unappropriated water 
in the proposed source of supply in connection with an orig-
inal application, or to know whether the proposed use would 
or would not impair any vested right, and what has been said 
by appellants about his judgment on administration would 
apply as to his judgment on other matters. Yet, as to all 
these matters, to the extent they were properly before the 
State Engineer, the District Court had full jurisdiction on the 
trial de novo. The question of feasibility, to the extent it 
was before the State Engineer, and before the District Court. 
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~s in no different position than the other questions they had 
to decide. 
Section 100-3-8, UCA, 1943, governs the action of the 
State Engineer both on applications to appropriate and 
change applications, and insofar as material to this argu-
ment, reads: 
"It shall be the duty of the State Engineer, upon 
payment of the approval fee, to approve an application 
if (1} There is unappropriated water in the proposed 
source; (2) The proposed use will not impair existing 
rights, or interfere with the more beneficial use of the 
water; (3) The proposed plan is physically and economi-
cally feasible unless the application is filed by the Unit-
ed States Bureau of Reclamation and would not prove 
detrimental to the public welfare; and (4) The applicant 
has the financial ability to complete the proposed works 
and the application was filed in good faith and not for 
purposes of speculation or monopoly; provided, that 
where the State Engineer, because of information in his 
possession obtained either by his own investigation or 
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to 
appropriate water will interfere with its more benefi-
cial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock wa-
tering, power or mining development or manufacturing, 
or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it shall 
be his duty to withhold his aproval or rejection of the 
application until he shall have investigater the matter 
, 
It will be seen that if certain facts exist it is the duty 
of the State Engineer to approve the application. We will 
no~ pause to argue whether the· views of the State Engin-
eer on whether the change could be readily administered 
would justify rejection by the State Engineer in any case; 
Let us assume that the claimed difficulty of administration 
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falls under the subject of "feasibility" referred to in the 
statute, for the sake of argument. The question of feasi-
bility is in exactly the same position as the question of im-
pairment of other rights, or in the case of an application to 
appropriate, the question of whether there is any unap-
propriated water. It is only under the provision of the last 
quoted statute, where the State Engineer from his investi-
gation or otherwise ". . . has reason to believe that 
an application to appropriate water will interfere with its 
more beneficial use", that the opinion of the State Engi-
neer, as such, is given any weight. Even then, whether 
such belief was justified and whether that phase of the 
statute will be applied, still is a matter for judicial deter-
mination upon an appeal from the decision of the State En-
gineer, and the question will be decided de novo. See Tan-
ner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957. This phase of 
the statute is not involved in our case. 
On the other matters, including the matters before the 
State Engineer in the instant case, this Court has repeat-
edly upheld the jurisdiction of the District Court on both 
fact and law questions to make its determination de novo, 
irrespective of what the State Engineer actually decided. 
Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 
202, 135 P.2d 108, supra; Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 
77 P.2d 367, supra; Little Cottonwood Water Co .. v. Kim-
ball, 76 Utah 243, 289 Pac. 116, supra; Whitmore v. Welch, 
____ Utah , 201 P.2d 954, supra. 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 
748, clearly indicates that the same rule as to the State 
Engineer's functions on an original application applies to 
a change application. Eardley v. Terry, supra, cited in the 
opinion, involved an original application, and the Whitmore 
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case proper in connection with the matter quoted, involved 
a change application. The court said (p. 750): 
"A literal reading of the portion of the above sec-
tion which we have italicized (Sec. 100-3-3, R.S.U. 
1933) would lead one to believe that the determina-
tion of the state engineer ,approving or denying an 
application for change of point of diversion adjudicat-
ed the rights of parties, since the act provided that no 
such change shall be made 'if it impairs any vested 
right, without just compensation', and it would appear 
that a necessary implication is that the state engineer 
must determine the existence or non-existence of such 
vested rights before he acts, and that when he does 
act and approves an application, that in so doing he has 
found that no vested rights are impaired. However, 
such a construction would fail to take cognizance of 
the purposes of our Water and Irrigation Act and the 
rights and duties of the state engineer as there set out. 
The office of the state engineer was not created to ad-
judicate vested rights between parties, but to admin-
ister and supervise the appropriation of the waters of 
the state. In Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 
362, this court considered the rights and duties of the 
state engineer in approving or denying an application 
for appropriation of water rights and we there held 
that in fulfilling his duties he acts in an administrative 
capacity only and has no authority to determine rights 
of parties. The same reasoning applies to the extent 
of the state engineer's authority when he determines 
to grant or deny an application for change of diver-
sion, use or place. It follows that in granting Murray 
City the right to change its point of diversion and re-
turn, the state engineer did not adjudicate the priority 
to the use of the water at the point of diversion, but 
merely determined that it could use the water at that 
point as long as it did not interfere with the prior 
rights of others . " 
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Appellants cite the case of Garrison v. Davis, 88 Utah 
358, 54 P.2d 439 in support of their contention that before 
the District Court the recommendations of the State En-
gineer are entitled to great weight. The problem involved 
in that case was an entirely different one, involving as it 
did, the interpretation of an uncertain decree and it was a 
wholly different case, being a general adjudication. The 
context of the reference to the State Engineer will at once 
show that the case does not support appellants' argument 
as applied to the case at bar. We quote from page 443 of 
the opinion: 
"It will thus be observed that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine with any degree of certainty 
just what the court below meant when it retained jur-
isdiction for the purpose of making 'minor corrections'. 
That it retained jurisdiction for the purpose of making 
corrections in the decree is clear, but it is by no means 
clear as to the extent, if any, that the use of the word 
'minor' limited the power of the court to make correc-
tions. If resort be had to the whole record, as it may 
be, for the purpose of removing doubt, we find that the 
state engineer recommended 'that the court retain jur-
isdiction of this case for a period of five years for the 
purpose of making adjustments in the duty of water, 
correction of errors and for such other purposes as 
time may indicate to the court as proper and just.' 
While it may be that the trial court was not bound to 
accept such recommendation, still in the light of the 
fact that the state engineer collected the information 
which formed the basis of the decree, the recommen-
dation of the state engineer was entitled to great 
weight.. In this connection it will be noted that Laws 
of Utah, 1919, ch. 67, para. 33, directs that: 'If no con-
test on the part of any claimant or claimants shall have 
been filed, the court shall render a judgment in accord-
ance with such proposed determination', etc." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
In the instant case the statute expressly directs that 
the court make a determination de novo, not that it shall 
adopt the view of the State Engineer in the absence of pro-
test. The reversing of such view is the very purpose of the 
appeal and trial de novo. In the general adjudication suit, 
the recommendation of the State Engineer was properly 
before the court as the basis of the decree, in the absence 
of protest at the hearing. In the case at bar, the State En-
gineer offered no evidence, nor were his views before the 
court except as reflected in the very decision which it was 
th court's duty to make anew. 
It seems to us that the expression "trial de novo" is too 
familiar on appeals from the City Court to the District 
Court, both in criminal and civil cases, and the jurisdiction 
of the court in actions in equity too well known, to require 
any further belaboring of the point that the statute speaks 
for itself as to the duties and powers of the District Court 
on review of the decision of the State Engineer. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the contentions of appellants contrary 
to the express terms of the statute and the decided cases 
cannot be sustained. We further submit that as indicated 
in the conclusion to Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Jones, 
Utah , 202 P.2d 892, the denial of respondents appli-
cation would require the adoption of rules not consistent 
with our statute and "not in conformity with the announced 
policy of the state to liberally construe rights toward the 
development and beneficial use of all waters of this state. 
As stated in many of our cases and as indicated in the quo-
tation from Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir 
Co., supra, if no unappropriated water in fact exists (or 
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more properly in the case at bar, if the change cannot be 
effected Without impairing vested rights or cannot be ad-
ministered-comment ours), then the defendant (applicant) 
would get nothing. He of course will take subject to all ex-
isting rights. . Against them it may well be that 
the applicant will fall down in his attempt . . . . This, 
however, is a matter to be adjudicated when the time comes 
if these parties consider themselves aggrieved, or their 
rights threatened." 
The vitality of our water laws lies largely in their prac-
ticability and their adaptability to new developments and 
necessities in the interest of an increasingly beneficial use 
of available water supplies. The contentions sought to be 
applied by appellants in this case, if adopted and applied 
to their logical and full extent, would freeze the water econ-
omy of large areas in our state. They would put water 
users in every mountain valley at the mercy of the owners 
of storage rights below for no good reason. They would 
make impossible the more beneficial use of water and would 
throw into question valuable water rights dependent now 
upon broad and practical, not narrow and hyper-technical, 
administration. They would render our water resources 
static rather than dynamic. Specifically, in connection with 
appellants' argument that no matter how minute the ef-
fect might be, no change can be permitted, they would pre-
vent transfer from ditch to ditch or from area to area with-
in a small canal or river system because of some fanciful 
and theoretical effect upon quantity or time of return flow. 
They would make water rights as uncertain and transitory 
as a cloudless sky. They would even make impossible the 
operation of Deer Creek, impounding as it does "demand" 
water resulting from the holding back of established rights 
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for various canal companies. They would make the courts 
merely an echo of the State Engineer's office in almost ev-
ery case, and they would not only do violence to our exist-
ing system of water rights, but would throw into confusion 
basic and accepted concepts on the essential separation of 
powers .. 
The District Court should not have accepted such con-
tentions and it did not. It is of the utmost importance to 
all farmers and other water users throughout the state that 
this Court does not accept them. 
The respondents may, by a change of the nature of use 
application, acquire the right to temporarily store water, 
the direct flow of which has heretofore been appropriated 
by them and thereafter release such water for irrigation 
within the same area, when such change can be made with-
out impairing any vested or existing rights, and will serve 
to prevent waste and permit a more beneficial use of the 
water, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants 
a1·e in no position to complain because frequently they do 
not utilize the rights which they claim might be impaired 
and must release water which they impound into Great Salt 
Lake. The record discloses that the proposed plan for 
diversion and storage will not interfere with the rights of 
the lower users, either as to volume, time of use or oth-
erwise. The proposed plan of diversion, storage and dis-
tribution can be so administered as to insure that the 
rights of lower users will not be injuriously affected; the 
State Engineer's determination that the application cannot 
be so administered as to avoid such injury is not supported 
by the evidence, has been abandoned by the State Engineer 
through failure to adduce any evidence in support thereof 
and has been properly reversed by the findings and judg-
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ment of the court based upon the evidence and the law; 
and the State Engineer's decision is subject to the findings 
and judgment of the court on a trial de novo, as provided 
by the express terms of the statute and as required by our 
system of law. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, 
with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
FOR CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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